I agree in some respects DAM (dual aspect monism) is close to idealism and Atmanspacher notes that several times. He suggests Eddington is neo-Kantian but even Kant as I understand it (little) and his transcendental idealism walks a fine line. Some versions of DAM seem to make mind primary while others, and Polkinghorne notes this, seem to be nearly materialistic. I'm not sure I can clearly define the lines. Kastrup in Decoding Jung's Metaphysics says that he thinking the Pauli-Jung explanation may be the closest yet to explaining what is real. I can find that quote for you if you like. So even Kastrup while clearly placing mind as the "ontological primitive" does not entirely rule out some kind of physicality it seems, or else he is not entirely consistent. Donald Hoffman also has said he thinks there is some kind of objective reality but does not see how we can access it.