Panpsychism trapped by physicalism
This is the final post in the series on panpsychism as argued by philosopher Galen Strawson. The previous posts explored his argument that realist physicalists, those who accept experience as a real thing, must accept panpsychism as a fact of nature. We noted his inconsistency in abusing and then using emergence as an explanation. We conclude by showing how he varies greatly from William James and Arthur Eddington, the great thinkers he quotes to support his position. The difference comes down to this: can real physicalism support an understanding of mind?
The title of Strawson’s essay is “Realistic Monism” because he offers this as a physicalist defense of monism: the idea there is but one fundamental underlying reality. As a “realist physicalist monist” he shows that accepting the undeniable reality of experience means that the one thing that is real is matter/energy and that means that it must include in its intrinsic nature experience in some form.
Throughout the essay he makes several references to Sir Arthur Eddington, the famous astronomer who did much to bring understanding to Einstein’s theory of relativity. Strawson quoted Eddington who called it “silly” to think that non-experiential matter could produce experience or consciousness.
He concludes by referring back to Eddington who employs James’ term “mind-stuff’: